example, the following sort of argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge of human actions and human freedom would have been considered a failure by most medievals because it depends on apremise that is ambiguous with respect to composition and division:
(1) Whatever must be the case is not subject to human free will.
(2) Whatever must be the case is necessarily true, and whatever is necessarily true must be the case.
(3) Whatever is known by God necessarily is true.
(4) God, who is omniscient, knows our future actions.
(5) Therefore, our future actions must occur.
(6) Therefore, our future actions are not subject to our free will.
Premise (3) is ambiguous with respect to composition and division because the modal operator 'necessarily' can govern 2 either the word 'true' or the sentence 'Whatever is known by God is true'. When it govems 'true', the sense of the premise is that whatever God knows is a necessary truth, or that if God knows that p, then necessarily p. When it govems 'Whatever is known by God is true', the sense of the premise is that 'Whatever God knows is true' is a necessary truth, or that it is necessarily the case that if God knows that p then p. The sense resulting when 'necessarily' governs 'Whatever is known by God is true' would have been taken to be true insofar as it expresses the fundamental truth that whatever one knows is true. On the other hand, the sense resulting when 'necessarily' governs 'true' would have been taken to be false on the incompatibilist conviction that people sometimes act freely, and that actions performed on those occasions are not causally necessitated. Thus, the medievals could avoid accepting (6) by maintaining that the argument resulting when (3) is taken in its true sense is invalid, and that the argument resulting when (3) is taken in its other sense is valid but unsound.
One can see, then, how having a basic understanding of compo. . . sition and division would be important to the scholastics. So it is hardly surprising that, between the beginning of the twelfth century and the end of the fifteenth, more than one account of the nature of composition and division was put forward. William Ockham offers an 2 . Here the word 'govem' means 'modify', but is intended to designate a genus of grammatical relationships of which modification is only one. account that differs in two important respects from earlier accounts, and I would like to discuss that account here. My focus will be on what he takes to be the defining characteristics of composition and division, and what he seems to take to be the link between composition and division and two of the other four types of ambiguity that arise in language.
OCKHAM'S DEFINITION OF COMPOSITION AND DIVISION: A PRELIMINARY WORRY
Ockham gives his most detailed account ofcomposition and division in his Summa logicae and Expositio super libros Elen, chorum. 3 According to hirn, composition and division are ambiguities which arise when, (a) a written or spoken expression can have different senses simply in virtue of different punctuations or pronunciations of the words in that expression,4 and (b) the expression has no sense independently of being punctuated or pronounced in one way or another. 5 For example, the expression 'Whoever lives always is' (Quicumque vivit semper est) is taken by Ockham to have neither the sense it has when it is punctuated 'Whoever lives always, is' nor the sense it has when it is punctuated 'Whoever lives, always is'. In the first case, the word 'always' govems 'lives', and the sense is that whoever has sempitemal life exists-which is true. In the second case, 'always' governs 'is', and the sense is that whoever lives exists sempiternally-which is false. Ockham stresses that the source 3 'you' can be either the subject or the object of the subordinate verb.
The utterance thus has two senses-one in which my wish is that you capture the enemy, one in which my wish is that the enemy captures you. These two senses cannot, however, be brought out on the basis of punctuation or pronunciation. In addition to maintaining that composition and division arise when and only when a written or spoken expression can have different senses in virtue of different punctuation or pronunciation, Ockham maintains that there are two modes (or sorts) of composition and division. One mode occurs when the ambiguous expression is in each of its senses categorical, or is in each of its senses hypothetical. Another mode occurs when the sense of composition is categorical and the sense of division is hypothetica1. 8 11. Someone might suppose that it is plausible to say that this first sense of 'Whoever lives always is' is expressed in a categorical and the second in a hypothetical (e.g., 'If any person lives, he exists always'). In such a case the original expression is an example of the second mode of composition and division. But surely if one can take the second sense as expressed in a hypothetical, one can take the first sense as expressed in a hypothetical (e.g., 'If any person lives always, he exists'). In such a case, the original expression must still be considered an example of the first mode. It must be considered one all the more, since, given their similarity, it would be irrational to treat the one sense as hypothetical and the other as categorical. Rationality dictates that each sense be taken as categorical or each as hypothetical. These considerations notwithstanding, it is theoretically possible for someone to take one sense as categorical and the other as hypothetical in such cases. Yet Ockham's characterization of the two modes of composition and division does not take into account this possibility. 12. For example, some of Ockham's predecessors might say that in the case of the expression 'Whoever lives always is', the compounded sense is the one that results when the word 'always' is taken as goveming the principal verb, and the divided sense the one that results when the word 'always' is taken as goveming the subordinate verb. That 'always' is naturally suited to be compounded with the principal verb is defended on the grounds that the principal or main verb in an expression plays the role of a verb more than does the verb of the subordinate clause in the same expression insofar as there is no complete thought, no sentence without it. At least this is the way Lambert of Auxerre puts it: "nam verbum principale magis se habet in natura verbi quam verbum non principale vel implicativum.. 13. As it turns out, Ockham does tell us how to distinguish the compounded and divided senses in modal contexts. According to him, a (genuine) modal proposition is one in which a mode ('true', 'false', 'possible', 'necessary', and so on) can be taken with a dictum (an expression in indirect discourse, where both the subject and does say is that it is up to a person to say what he would like and to take the words 'compounded' and 'divided' as he pleases. 14 We will not, then, get from Ockham the help we need to identify one sense of an ambiguous expression as the compounded sense, the other as the divided sense.
At one point in Summa logicae, Ockham even goes so far as to say that he does not care how composition and division are described, "since I don't think that knowing this is very useful for the special sciences, although knowing how to draw distinctions regarding such expressions is very useful."15 Presumably if he does not care how com. . . position and division are described, he does not care, once again, in what way the compounded sense and the divided sense are described. Nor does he care whether one sense is distinguished as a compounded sense rather than a divided sense or vice versa. For one cannot non. . . arbitrarily distinguish the senses unless one has a view about why one sense is called compounded and the other divided. Once one has formulated such a view, however, one has thereby committed oneself predieate are in the aeeusative ease and the eopula is an infinitive). A eompounded sense of the modal proposition is expressed when the modal term is predieated of the dictum of the original proposition, and a divided sense is expressed when the modal term is predieated of a sentenee whose predieate is the predieate of that dictum, and whose subjeet is the word 'this' or a pronoun standing for the referent of the subjeet of that dictum. For example, 'That a white thing is blaek is possible' (Album esse nigrum est possibile) is taken by Oekham to be a modal proposition, its eompounded sense being '''A white thing is blaek" is possible', and its divided sense being '''This is blaek" is possible', where 'this' refers to something that is white. The eompounded sense is false, sinee a thing eannot be white and blaek at one and the same time; but the divided sense is true, sinee same white thing (a table, say) ean be blaek (insafar as it ean be painted) at same time other than the time at whieh it is white. See Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (deI Punta 36-37), Summa log. 2.8.9 (Boehner 273-279) and 3.4.8 (Boehner 787). The example we are eonsidering-'Omne possibile si est neeessarium est verum'-is not a modal proposition aeeording to Oekham, sinee it has no mode that ean be taken with a dictum. Therefore, this example is not one about whieh
Oekham has anything to say regarding whieh of its senses is eompounded and whieh is divided, or why those senses are to be so deseribed.
14. Super üb. Elench. "Similiter, ut frequenter, orationes in quibus ponitur adieetivum eum substantivo distinguendae sunt, sieut tales 'iste est bonus sutor', demonstrando malum hominem. Si sit oratio divisa, falsa est, quia tune denotatur quod est bonus et quod est sutor; si sit eomposita, tune vera est, quia tune denotatur quod habet perfeete talern artem suendi." Compare note 13 above.
ambiguity. Given the historical context, then, as well as the evidence of his position's internal inconsistency, Ockham needs to explain why we needn't trouble ourselves with these details. That speakers may take words as they please would seem in this case beside the point.
This worry about Ockham's account of the nature of composition and division may perhaps be satisfactorily dispelled if one notices the following. First, the two linguistic phenomena one attempts to distinguish in the case of composition and division may not, after all, be precisely distinguishable. Ockham's predecessors had put forward varied and sometimes conflicting accounts of what composition and division are, and no consensus was ever reached.l 9 If there were in fact no precise way of distinguishing composition from division, that would certainly explain why there had been no consensus. 20 Second, what Aristotle describes as the other four individual fallacies in language (Le., equivocation, amphiboly, accent, and figura dictionis) possess the same general characteristic as do the alleged two fallacies he calls composition and division. This characteristic is ambiguity arising from two or more possible construals of a grammatical unit, where a gram. . . matical unit is an expression, a word, or part of a word (e.g., a suffix). So, for example, even though in the case of the fallacy of accent an expression can have at least two senses depending on the way one particular word in the expression is pronounced, those two senses are not given technical names, nor are two different fallacies picked out on the basis of the two possible pronunciations. differently. Furthermore, in order to communicate effectively, to un. . . derstand what is being said, or to do well in academic disputations or logical exercises it would be important to recognize ambiguity, although it would not matter whether the various senses associated with that ambiguity had names. One can recognize, for example, that the expression 'Flying planes can be dangerous' is ambiguous and that the ambiguity depends on the possibility of taking the word 'flying' as either an adjective modifying 'plane' or as a verb whose direct object is 'plane'. There seems, however, to be no practical point whatsoever in arguing for special names for these senses, because there seem to be no characterizable phenomena other than the ambiguity broadly picked out as equivocation.
If the three reasons just mentioned are collectively convincing as reasons for departing from tradition, then Ockham's basic account of compounded/divided ambiguity can be defended. In conjunction with that defense, however, one will have to conclude that by falling back into talk of compounded senses and divided senses in Summa logicae, Ockham was simply being careless. One will also have to conclude that Ockham therefore should have simply described the second mode of composition and division as one which arises when one sense of the ambiguous expression in question is categorical and the other h ypothetical.
Finally, assuming that the three reasons just mentioned are some. . . thing like the reasons that motivated Ockham in his account of com. . . position and division, that account-that departure from traditioncan be seen as based on an application of the Principle of Parsimony: One should never multiply entities (or their names) without good reason.
A FURTHER REFINEMENT OF OCKHAM'S ACCOUNT: FOUR CONTEXTS OF COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
Although Ockham does not think it is worthwhile to discuss which sense is compounded and which is divided, or why, he does take time to describe the contexts in which composition and division arise within the two modes. He recognizes four contexts. In what follows, I will discuss the second and third contexts because Ockham's discussion of them suggests that as far as he is concerned equivocation (or something like it) is the most basic of the linguistic fallacies-or at least is the one to which three of the six linguistic fallacies can be reduced. A perceived reducibility to equivocation of at least some of the standardly recognized types of ambiguity is a second important respect in which Ockham's account of composition and division differs trom the accounts of his predecessors.
COMPOSITION AND DIVISION PRODUCED BY LINGUISTIC MODIFICATION
In Summa logicae Ockham tells us that when an expres, sion contains a word that can be joined together with either of two 21. A term is anything that can be used as a subject, predicate, or copula in a categorical sentence, and anything that can be used as a modifier of the subject, predicate, or copula of such a sentence. A substantive term is a term which refers to what would fall into the Aristotelian category of substance.
22.
A dictum is an expression in indirect discourse, as for example 'that every man is an animai'. In Latin such expressions are in the accusative/infinitive construction, as for example 'omnem hominem esse animal' . An example of an expression involving both a dictum and a modal term is 'That every man is an animal is necessary' (Omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium).
words in that expression, the expression is ambiguous with respeet to eomposition and division. 23 We have already seen one example of this in 'Whoever lives always is'. The expression 'Whatever anyone knows now he has learned' (Quod quis seit nune didieit) is a seeond example insofar as its two senses ean be distinguished on the basis of punetuation or pronuneiation. 'Whatever anyone knows now, he has leamed' is one reading. Aeeording to Oekham, it is true beeause what, ever he now knows, he has already leamed. In this ease the adverb 'now' govems the word 'knows'. There is another reading: 'Whatever anyone knows, now he has leamed'. In this ease 'now' govems 'has leamed', and the resulting sense is one Oekham says is false. In neither instanee does Oekham identify the sense as eompounded or as divided.
Another example of an expression of this sort is 'Forty of men one hundred left godlike Aehilles' (Quadraginta virorum eentum reliquit dives Aehilles).24 Oekham's treatment of this example is worth explor, ing for reasons whieh will beeome elear shortly. In Summa logieae, Oekham elassifies the Aehilles example as a eompounded/divided ambiguous expression eontaining a word that ean be joined together either with one word or with another. In Super libros Elenehorum, however, he says that we ean see that (the senses of) 'Forty of men one hundred left godlike Aehilles' ean be distinguished in aeeordanee with eomposition and division, and amphiboly, and equivoeation. 25 As for the analysis on the basis of eomposition and division, Oekham merely tells us that there is one; he does not tell us what it iso He says, "In the same way it ean be analyzed on the basis of eomposition and division, as was said."26 In his analysis of the same expression on the basis of amphiboly, Oekham says that 'of men' (virorum) ean be eonstrued with 'forty' or with 'one hundred' (potest eonstrui eum li 'quadraginta' vel eum li 'eentum'). Here one should not be misled into thinking that this is really a eharaeterization of the various senses of 23. Summa log. 3 In his analysis of 'Forty of men one hundred left godlike Achilles' on the basis of equivocation, Ockham says that 'forty' can be taken in either the genitive or the accusative, and that 'one hundred' can be taken in either the accusative or the genitive. (The corresponding Latin words 'quadraginta' and 'centum' are indeclinable.) Equivocation brought about in virtue of the capacity of a word or words to be taken 27. Ockham takes amphiboly to be ambiguity in an expression (as opposed to a word) that cannot be sorted out on the basis of the way the expression is pronounced or punctuated (Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 [deI Punta 34.18-21]). According to hirn, there are three modes or sarts of amphiboly: (a) one expression, wherever it is written or uttered, has more than one distinguishable sense, (b) an expression has a primary signification in virtue of a primary imposition, and a secondary signification in virtue of a way of talking begun in connection with a special situation, and (c) an expression uttered or written by itself has one sense, yet when put with another expression becomes ambiguous (deI Punta 177.94-103).
in more than one grammatical case is the third mode of equivocation recognized by Aristotle. 28 When 'forty' is taken as genitive, 'men' is the noun it determines; 'one hundred' is then taken as accusative, and the sense of the expression is that of forty men, godlike Achilles left one hundred. 29 On the other hand, 'forty' can be taken as accusative and 'one hundred' as genitive, in which case the sense of the expres. . . sion is that of one hundred men, godlike Achilles left forty. The two senses of the expression recognized in connection with the analysis based on equivocation are the same two senses one must recognize when one analyzes the expression in connection with composition and division and in connection with amphiboly.30
On the basis of what we have just seen, I believe that Ockham's claim that the Achilles example can be distinguished in accordance with composition and division, amphiboly, and equivocation commits hirn to the view that there is more than one plausible analysis of that expression-one being preferable to the others. I say this because a compounded/divided analysis of the Achilles example does not ex. . . plain the existence of two possible senses of the expression in question unless it is assumed that in virtue of pronouncing or punctuating the expression in certain ways one comes to see which words are to be construed with which other words. The compoundedfdivided analysis cannot be understood except on the basis of the amphiboly analysis. Furthermore, Ockham's amphiboly analysis of the example does not explain the existence of two possible senses of the expression unless it is understood that 'of men' can be determined by either 'forty' or 'one hundred'. If 'of men' is construed with 'forty', isn't it the case that 'of men' is being taken as determined by 'forty', that 'forty' is being taken as genitive and 'one hundred' as accusative? And if 'of men' is construed with 'one hundred', isn't 'one hundred' taken as genitive and 'forty' as accusative? One cannot understand the amphiboly analysis except on the basis of the equivocation analysis.
These considerations strongly suggest that some compoundedf divided ambiguous expressions, if not most or all, are ambiguous in virtue of containing an equivocal term, and that one can describe such ambiguous expressions at levels less precise than the proper (or fundamental) description in terms of equivocation. In this case, the description of the Achilles example in terms of amphiboly can be seen as less explanatory than its description in terms of equivocation; and the description in terms of composition and division can be seen as even less explanatory than the description in terms of amphiboly.
Although Ockham explicitly connects equivocation, amphiboly, and composition and division only in Super libros Elenchorum, the views expressed in Summa logicae are compatible with the one I claim is expressed in Super libros Elenchorum. And although, as I pointed out earlier, Summa logicae was written after Super libros Elenchorum, Ock, harn does not in the Summa repudiate what he says in the commentary on this score. So, for instance, Ockham says in Summa logicae, And to me it seems that they [Le., expressions typically described as com, pounded/divided ambiguous 31 ] can be more plainly and more manifestly analyzed in Latin in respect of amphiboly, although perhaps in Aristotle's idiom or in Greek this kind of ambiguity in expressions of this sort is more manifest in respect of composition and division than in respect of amphiboly. In this passage Ockham teIls us that as far as he is concerned certain compounded/divided ambiguous expressions are more plainly analyzed in terms of amphiboly. I take it that he means by this that the analysis in terms of amphiboly yields more information than the analysis in terms of composition and division. And if) as I have suggested) the analysis in terms of composition and division is broader than the analysis in terms of amphiboly) one would of course expect the analysis in terms of amphiboly to be the plainer) more explanatory analysis.
COMPOSITION AND DIVISION PRODUCED BY AN ADJECTIVE TOGETHER WITH A SUBSTANTIVE TERM
The third context in which Ockham recognizes the com. . . pounded/divided ambiguity-that in which an adjective is placed with a substantive term-also falls under Mode I. Ockham says that 'He is a good shoemaker) (Iste est bonus sutor) is compounded/divided ambiguous. 33 The expression can mean either that this man is good and that he is a shoemaker) or that this man has mastered the art of shoemaking. Ockham goes on to say) And although such expressions can be analyzed in accordance with com. . . position and division, it seems to me that they can also be analyzed in accordance with amphiboly, and the senses [distinguished] will not be varied [in the two analyses]. Such propositions [as] 'He is a white monk' can be analyzed in the same way; in one sense it is denoted that he is white and that he is a monk, in another sense it is denoted that he is a monk of such. . .and. . .such an order.3 4 Although Ockham does not say here that expressions containing an adjective and a substantive term are more plainly analyzed in terms of amphiboly, he does say that they can be analyzed in terms of amphiboly with the same results. The plausibility of my interpretation will depend to some extent on whether expressions falling in this third context can be analyzed in terms of equivocation as weH as amphiboly and composition and division as these are defined by Ockham. The answer to that question is not at first glance clear. For although it may seem reasonable to think in the case of 'He is a white monk' that 'white' is ambiguous and can be taken as signifying either a color or a religious order, it may seem equally reasonable to think that in both senses of the expression 'white' signifies a color-the color of the monk's skin, or the color of his habit. Also, although it may seem reasonable to think in the case of 'He is a good shoemaker' that 'good' is ambiguous and can be taken as signifying either moral excellence or proficiency in a craft, it may seem equally reasonable to think that 'good' signifies the appropriate actualization of (different) relevant potentialities in both senses of the expression. 35 I believe, however, that the controversial positions that can be taken concerning the analyses of 'He is a good shoemaker' and 'He is a white monk' suggest that there is in fact some kind of variability in words such as 'good' and 'white'-a variability which it is altogether appropriate to call 'equivocation' insofar as it will fall under that mode of equivocation according to which a word is unambiguous in isolation but becomes ambiguous when joined with another word or expression. 36 If so, this would count in Ockham's favor, since he would then be seen as having a thesis about the reducibility of composition and division which does not smack of arbitrariness in being restricted to a small handful of compounded/divided ambiguous expressions. The question, then, is how might one bring out the aforementioned kind of variability or equivocation? First, although in connection with the monk example 'white' can be thought of as signifying color when the sense is that the man belongs to a particular religious order, surely its signification in that case is not restricted to color. The religious order could change the color of its habit and retain the name 'white monks'. And it could do that, I think, because a name signifies primarily its object and only secondarily, if at all, the object's accidental characteristics. Therefore, even if 'white' (even now) refers to the color of the robes worn by the order's first members, it also refers to one particular religious order irrespective of the color of its members' robes. In short, the signification of 'white' differs in the two senses of 'He is a white monk' if only because in one of those senses the signification is expanded or augmented to cover more than a particular color.
Second, in connection with the shoemaker example, the variability can be seen as associated with the signification of the term 'good', and with the sorts of things to which the term is applied. 'Good', unlike 'white', is what the medievals call a transcendental term (a term which can be correctly applied to absolutely everything insofar as it refers to what transcends Aristotle's ten categories). For instance, one can speak of the shoemaker's being good in respect of x (making shoes), and good in respect of y (living a moral life). Yariability associated with 'good' as used in the example has to do with the fact that 'good' does not specify enough about the object that is called 'good'-enough, that is, to be of use to anyone interested in communicating; and so the word that is modified by 'good' augments the signification of 'good' such that one understands in what way the object referred to has potentialities and is supposed to have realized those potentialities. The words 'appropriate' and 'relevant' in the definition of 'good' being presupposed for our purposes (Le., 'the appropriate actualization of relevant potentialities') are made precise by virtue of the words which 'good' can be connected with in a compounded/divided ambiguous expression. 37 It is possible, therefore, to make a case for expressions which fall under the third context of composition and division being reducible 38. The point I want to make here cannot be made using the English translation of the Latin, since in order to preserve the ambiguity in the English translation, the article 'a' would have to be omitted, rendering the English ('He is good shoemaker') ungrammatical.
39. In the latter case I take the sense to be 'He is a good man (Iste est bonus), [and] Ockham can get around this apparent difficulty by pointing out, first of all, that Aristotle makes this remark in the course of arguing that those people are mistaken who try to solve a certain example of ambiguity by saying that it turns on considering one and the same object in different respects 41 instead of solving it by pointing out that it depends on accident. The fallacy of accident is, however, a fallacy independent of language, and the fallacy recognized by Aristotle's imagined interlocutors, insofar as it at least resembles the fallacy secundum quill et simpliciter, also seems to be independent of language.
Given the context of Aristotle's remark at 179b17, then, it is not clear that whatever he means, he intends that remark to apply not only to fallacies independent of language, but to linguistic fallacies or fallacies in language as well-this latter being what presently concems us. Ockham can also point out that although Aristotle does say that fallacies independent of language can be reduced to ignoratio elenchi,42 it would be surprising to find hirn making a similar claim about linguistic fallacies, since he thinks not only that there must be a certain number of such fallacies (six), but thinks that this can be proved by induction and by syllogism. 43 My claim, then, that Ockham was doing something innovative still stands.
A second problem for the account of composition and division I at. . . tribute to Ockham is the following. Even if the account is supported by what Ockham says in connection with the second and third contexts of composition and division, unless it is likewise supported by what can be said about the first and fourth contexts, there is no reason to think that Ockham either believes or is committed to believing that composition/division is reducible to, or has as its source, equivocation.
I believe that one can at least begin to make a case for the first and fourth contexts also being reducible to equivocation. Consider, for instance, 'Five are three and two', which exemplifies the first context because in it a conjunction is placed between two terms. The two readings of 'Five are three and two' are 'Five are (three and two)' and 'Five are three, and five are two'. One can see that 'and' is not the same operator on both readings. On the second reading 'and' is used as an operator for sentential conjunction; on the first, 'and' is used as an operator for arithmetical summation, where the arguments are numbers and not sentences. 'And' can thus be seen as the equivocal term in this case.
Consider, also, 'It is possible that Peter speaks French'. This exam. . . pIe falls within the fourth context because it involves both a dictum and a modal term. The two readings in this case are '''Peter speaks French" is possible' and 'It is possible for Peter to speak French'. 'Possible', however, is not the same operator on both readings. On the first it is used epistemically, indicating that for all I know Peter speaks French. On the second it is used performatively, indicating that Peter has the ability to speak French. 44 Or consider 'It is possible that 42. Sophistici elenchi 6 (168a17-19).
Sophistici elenchi 4 (165b27-29).
44. This second reading is ambiguous in its own right insofar as the ability referred to can be either realized (as in the case of a skill) or unrealized (as in the case of a mere power). a seated person walk'. The two readings in this case are' "A seated person is walking" is possible' and 'It is possible for this individual (namely, the one who happens to be sitting) to walk'. Once again, 'possible' is not the same operator on both readings. On the first it modifies a sentence and is used absolutely, indicating that the state of affairs expressed by that sentence does not violate the law of non, contradiction (Le., is self,consistent); on the second it modifies a term, indicating that the thing referred to by that term has a particular ability. In each of these examples 'possible' can be seen as an equivocal term which modifies either a sentence or a term therein. 45 It is not clear, therefore, that the move Ockham makes to connect in some way the analyses of certain ambiguous expressions in terms of composition and division and equivocation cannot be made for them all in such a way that we see a full,fledged theory emerging.
CONCLUSION
If my reading of Ockham is correct, one sees Ockham during the early fourteenth century, razor in hand, attempting to bring order to a rather unwieldy century's worth of medieval accounts of composition and division. The result is his rejection of the view that Aristotle was correct in thinking that he had identified in the Sophis. . . tichi elenchi six distinct linguistic fallacies. This rejection is suggestive. If 'composition' and 'division' are two names for one apparent type of ambiguity, and this type of ambiguity is reducible to equivocation, and amphiboly is reducible to equivocation, are accent and figura dictionis also reducible to equivocation? I think that a case can be made for their being so.
First, in connection with accent, one can point out that particular words as they are written simply do have more than one sense. Take, 45 . Notice that the first readings of the two examples involving 'possible' depend on non..linguistic facts. On the basis of syntactical considerations it would be difficult to argue that even these first readings are not ambiguous insofar as 'possible' can in each case be taken epistemically or absolutely: 'For all I know Peter speaks French' and 'Peter's speaking French is a self..consistent state of affairs'; 'For all I know a sitting person is walking' and 'A sitting person's walking is a self..consistent state of affairs'. I will not speculate about why under ordinary circumstances we tend to ignore one of the two readings.
for example, i,n,v,a,l,i,d, which is in one of its senses appropriate to use in describing an argument, in the other sense aperson. Second, in connection with figura dictionis, one could say with plausibility that given the various functions a particular prefix or suffix can serve, particular words which include them simply do have more than one sense. Take, for example, 'desirable', which can mean either 'is worthy of being desired' or 'can be desired'.46 One could, then, construct diagrams for accent and figura dictionis similar to the diagram Ockham would construct for amphiboly and composition and division. In other words, the case can be made that there is only one linguistic fallacy, and it is equivocation. This result, though it conflicts with what Aristotle says about ambiguity in the Sophistichi elenchi, might nevertheless be greeted by
Aristotle with approval. I say this because, as I pointed out earlier, it is Aristotle's view that the seven fallacies that arise independently of language are reducible to one-ignoratio elenchi. Its tuming out that the six fallacies that arise in language are also reducible to one-to equivocation-makes for a satisfying symmetry.
